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Quota restrictions on United States imports of apparel and textiles under the multifibre arrangement
(MFA) ended abruptly in January 2005. This change in policy was large, predetermined, and fully
anticipated, making it an ideal natural experiment for testing the theory of trade policy. We focus on
simple and robust theory predictions about the effects of binding quotas, and also compute nonparametric
estimates of the cost of the MFA. We find that prices of quota constrained categories from China fell
by 38% in 2005, while prices in unconstrained categories from China and from other countries changed
little. We also find substantial quality downgrading in imports from China in previously constrained
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  The economic analysis of trade policy is as old as economics, but the ratio of 
convincing evidence to theory remains small.
1 The reason is simple: trade policies 
generally change gradually, making it hard to untangle the effects of policy from the 
effects of other factors that influence trade. A related empirical problem, highlighted by 
Trefler (1993), is the political endogeneity of protection, which creates the need for valid 
instrumental variables for protection in most analyses of the effects of trade policy.  
  This paper uses a natural experiment in U.S. trade policy to get around these 
thorny inference problems. The system of bilateral quotas long known as the multifibre 
arrangement (MFA) regulated global trade in apparel and textiles for many decades, and 
a major achievement of the Uruguay Round concluded in 1995 was that WTO members 
agreed to phase out MFA quotas no later than January 1, 2005
2. Like most big importers, 
the U.S. delayed the bulk of MFA liberalization until literally the last moment, with 
hundreds of binding quotas still in place until midnight on December 31 2004. As the 
new year dawned, a veritable tsunami of cheap textile and apparel products from China 
and other developing countries started to swamp U.S. ports. This large, sudden, fully 
anticipated, easily measured, and statistically exogenous change in trade policy provides 
the natural experiment that we use in this paper to test some simple theories about the 
effects of quotas. 
  We test two fundamental predictions: binding quotas raise prices and lead to 
“quality upgrading”, that is, a shift in the mix of products under a given quota toward 
more expensive goods. These predictions are resoundingly confirmed: when the MFA 
ended, prices and quality of U.S. imports in previously quota-constrained categories fell 
dramatically, especially on quota-constrained goods from China. By contrast, non-
constrained imports showed no systematic changes in prices or quality. These results are 
highly robust, and require no restrictive assumptions on functional form or exogeneity. 
                                                           
1 The ratio is not zero, however. See Feenstra (1995) for an excellent survey. Much high-quality work on 
the effects of trade policy is done at the World Bank; see for example Laird and Yeats (1990) and Kee et al 
(2006). The NAFTA agreement has occasioned some fine ex post analyses, including Trefler (2004) and 
Romalis (2005). 
2 When the Uruguay round was agreed, the MFA was replaced by the “Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing” or ATC. To keep acronym profusion in check, we will continue to use the older term MFA in the 
remainder of this paper.   2
  We are also able to calculate estimates of what the MFA cost U.S. consumers in 
2004: the equivalent variation was approximately $9.8 billion, which amounts to an 
annual cost per household of almost $90. Most of this welfare gain was due to the 
dramatic drop in prices, and increase in quantities, from China. 
  The end of the MFA, and the consequent unleashing of China’s vast potential for 
producing cheap labor intensive textile and apparel products, was widely predicted to 
lead to calamity for other developing country textile and apparel exporters. We show that 
these fears were not borne out, at least for big exporters to the United States. The reason 
is that most of the big exporters were also quota constrained in 2004, and were able to 
sharply increase their exports when the MFA ended despite intensified competition from 
China. The major exception is Mexico, whose privileged access to the U.S. market ended 
with the end of the MFA.     
 
2. U.S. TRADE POLICY IN APPAREL AND TEXTILES 
 
A variety of restrictions have long affected trade in textile and apparel products.
3  
One of the broadest sets of policies, however, became effective in 1974.  The MFA 
established a system of quotas, negotiated bilaterally, that limited imports of textile and 
apparel products.   
Participants in the Uruguay Round of trade talks agreed to phase out the MFA 
beginning in 1995.  The MFA was replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) which put in place a system for gradual elimination of quantitative restrictions.  
The ATC incorporated a series of stages, with phase-outs occurring at the beginning of 
1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005, at which time all remaining quotas were eliminated.  
Between 1995 and 2005, remaining quotas were progressively enlarged, using agreed-to 
increasing growth rates.  The agreement also established a special safeguard mechanism 
for protection against surges and a monitoring body to supervise implementation. 
When the MFA first came into effect, China was not a member of the World  
Trade Organization (WTO), so it was not a part of the initial MFA phase-out process.  
However, upon accession to the WTO at the end of 2001, China became eligible for 
participation in the MFA quota elimination process.  Thus, the United States generally   3
implemented the first three stages of “integration” (i.e., into the MFA quota liberalization 
program) for China in the first part of 2002.
4  When it joined the WTO, China also agreed 
to a special safeguard on its textile and apparel exports.  Under this safeguard 
mechanism, if a WTO member felt that textile and apparel imports from China threatened 
to “impede the orderly development of trade in these products,” it could request that 
China limit its exports to that country, generally for no more than one year.  If 
consultations did not lead to a different solution, China would agree to hold its exports of 
the given product “to a level no greater than 7.5 per cent (6 per cent for wool product 
categories) above the amount entered during the first 12 months of the most recent 14 
months preceding the month in which the request for consultations was made.” This 
safeguard mechanism will remain in place until December 31, 2008.  As we will discuss 
below, there was one such safeguard quota in effect on U.S. imports from China in 2005 
even after all MFA quotas were eliminated on January 1, and twelve new safeguard 
quotas were imposed in mid-2005. For more on how the ATC was implemented, with a 
particular focus on China, see Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (2007).  
The MFA was not the only U.S. trade policy that affected apparel and textile trade 
in 2000-2005. However, these other policies saw no significant change between 2004 and 
2005. Since our empirical analysis below looks exclusively at time-series variation during 
this period, we mention these other policies only briefly here. 
In addition to agreeing to eliminate quantitative restrictions as part of the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round, the United States agreed to reduce its tariffs on 
textile and apparel products.  According to the Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA, a 
division of the U.S. Commerce Department that administers the US’s MFA quotas) tariffs 
on textile and apparel products were slated to decline from a trade weighted average of 
17.2 percent ad valorem in 1994 to a trade weighted average of 15.2 percent ad valorem 
in 2004.  The majority of these reductions were phased in over the 10 years.
5  
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 The analysis in this section is based on Evans and Harrigan (2005).  
4 See Federal Register, Volume 66, No. 249, December 28, 2001; Federal Register, Volume 67, No. 53, 
March 19, 2002; WTO (2001) “Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China.”  WT/MIN(01)/3, 
November 10, 2001; and International Trade Commission (2004) “Textiles and Apparel: Assessment of the 
Competitiveness of Certain Foreign Suppliers to the U.S. Market.”  Investigation No. 332-448.  USITC 
Publication 3671. 
5 See OTEXA 1995.   4
Regional liberalization efforts have also affected the degree to which quantitative 
restrictions constrain trade.  The main regional agreements affecting the period which we 
examine are the Caribbean Basin Initiative/ Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBI/CBERA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
6  The 
CBI/CBERA programs, initially enacted in the mid-1980s, provided preferential 
treatment for imports from twenty-four countries in that region.
7   
 
3. THEORY: PRICE, QUALITY, AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF QUOTAS 
The specification of MFA quota limits always had two features:  
1.  They were fairly broad, potentially including many different products. Some 
examples are “Womens’ and girls’ dresses, cotton” and “Mens’ and boys’ 
sweaters, wool”. 
2.  They were specified not in value terms but in terms of physical quantities 
(numbers of dresses, square meters of fabric, dozens of pairs of socks, etc).  
What does economic theory predict about the effects of such broad, quantity-specified 
quotas?
8  
  Trivially, a binding quota will reduce the quantity of imports, but beyond this the 
effects depend on details of demand and market structure. Numerous authors have 
pointed out that no simple “tariff equivalents” exist for quotas except in the simplest of 
cases; for example, see Anderson (1988) and Feenstra (2004, Chapter 8). Some of the 
more interesting analyses of the economics of quotas occurs when markets are 
imperfectly competitive; see, for example, the celebrated paper of Krishna (1989). What 
virtually any model predicts is that binding quotas will raise prices. That is, in the 
absence of a binding quota, prices of the products imported under the quota would be 
lower. 
  A slightly subtler effect is that a binding quota on a broad category causes 
“quality upgrading”, a phenomenon first analyzed by Falvey (1979) and Rodriguez 
                                                           
6 The Andean Trade Preference Act  (ATPA) was another program that provided benefits that, in some 
cases, applied to trade in apparel.  The (ATPA) was signed into law on December 4, 1991, but excluded 
many apparel products. Ineligible products included, “textile and apparel items subject to textile 
agreements on the date that the ATPA took effect.”  See Shelburne (2002). 
7 Note that benefits were subject to the countries satisfying certain conditions.   5
(1979).
9 Quality upgrading occurs when the quota causes the composition of imports to 
be tilted toward goods that would be relatively more expensive under free trade. 
  There are potentially two distinct types of quality upgrading: changes in 
characteristics of given varieties, and a shift in demand toward higher-quality varieties 
(see Feenstra (2004, Chapter 8) for details). The latter is what we study, and the 
economics is simple: with a physical quantity quota, firms set quota rents as the same 
dollar amount over marginal cost. This means that high cost/quality goods see their 
relative price fall, so relative quantities sold go up.
10 Evidence of this type of quality 
upgrading is provided by Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) for quota-constrained U.S. steel 
imports in the 1970s. We will ignore within-variety change, which may be substantial.  
For example, Feenstra (1988) finds substantial within-model quality upgrading in 
response to the U.S. quota on Japanese cars in the mid-1980s. The two quality-upgrading 
effects are complementary, so our measure of quality upgrading will be a lower bound. 
  Quality upgrading is socially inefficient, and causes a welfare cost to quotas that 
would not be present under an equally restrictive tariff. Even in the absence of quality 
upgrading binding quotas will impose efficiency costs and will redistribute income. From 
the standpoint of importing country welfare, the MFA is particularly costly since it allows 
exporters to keep quota rents (Krishna and Tan, 1998). Calculating welfare costs of 
protection generally requires details about demand and supply, information that can be 
estimated imprecisely at best. However, the total effect of any policy (including a quota) 
on consumers can be computed using measures of equivalent and compensating variation. 
Letting a superscript 0 denote the pre-reform, quota-ridden equilibrium and a superscript 
1 denote the post reform equilibrium, the standard definitions of equivalent and 
compensating variation are 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
01 11 01 1 1 ,,, EV u u u μμμ =−=− ppp p x  
  ( ) ( ) ( )
00 10 0 0 10 ,, , CV u u u μμ μ =−= − pp p x p  
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 An alternative type of quota is one where the value of imports is restricted rather than the physical 
quantity. 
9 The quality upgrading insight appears to have occurred to Falvey and Rodriguez independently, with each 
paper somewhat grudgingly citing the working paper version of the other.  
10 This is also known as the Alchian-Allen/Washington apples effect. See Hummels and Skiba (2004).    6
where u is utility in each situation,  ( ) ,
ab u μ p  is minimal expenditure required at prices p
a 
to attain utility u
b, and x is optimally chosen consumption.
11 Thus, EV uses post-reform 
utility levels to compare the two situations, and CV uses pre-reform utility. EV is the 
answer to the question, “how much money would consumers facing the new prices have 
to be given to be indifferent between the new and old prices?”
12 CV is the answer to the 
question, “how much money would consumers facing the old prices be willing to pay to 
be indifferent between the new and old prices?”. 
 Calculation  of  EV and CV requires knowing the form of the expenditure function 
μ, and in particular the full Hicksian cross-price elasticities across products and supplier 
countries, knowledge we do not have and can not plausibly estimate.  A non-parametric 
solution to this problem is to take a first-order Taylor series approximation of the 
expenditure function evaluated at each situation. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, section 
7.4) show that  
  ( )
00 1 CV − qp p           ( 1 a )  
  ( )
10 1 EV − qp p           ( 1 b )  
These approximations are also quite intuitive. The first uses old quantities to weigh the 
price changes, while the second uses new quantities to weigh the same price changes. 
 EV and CV answer different questions, and so neither is an unambiguous measure 
of consumer welfare change. A compromise measure suggested by Deaton and 
Muellbauer is 
  () ()
1001 1
2
W =+ − qqpp         ( 1 c )  
The number W uses an average of the quantities as weights for the price change, and is a 
first-order approximation to a simple average of the true EV and true CV. While it has no 
direct welfare interpretation, we will use W in our results as a convenient way of splitting 
the difference between EV and CV.  
  The above calculations of EV, CV, and W require the use of appropriate index 
                                                           
11 Our exposition here follows Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Chapter 7), except that we change the signs 
of EV and CV so that a positive number denotes welfare improvement.   7
numbers, and when we implement them we will use the exact price index due to Feenstra 
(1994), which relies on the CES functional form for the subutility given by each group of 
goods over which the price index is calculated. Having made a functional form 
assumption for purposes of computing price indices, why do we not make an additional 
functional form assumption for combining prices into an expenditure function? The 
answer is that our approach in this paper is to make as few assumptions as necessary, and 
see what can be learned as a consequence. Any further precision in our results gained 
from assuming a functional form for the expenditure function would come solely from 
that assumption. 
 
4. DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
Our trade data come from the Census Bureau, and are analyzed at the 10-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) level, the most disaggregated classification available. Each 
import observation includes information on date, source country, value in dollars, and 
physical quantity (such as number of shirts).    
  Apparel and textile quotas are administered by the Office of Textiles and Apparel 
(OTEXA), a division of the Department of Commerce. Quotas apply to country-specific 
quota groups constructed by OTEXA and these quota groups contain multiple 10-digit 
HS codes
13.  From OTEXA we obtained information on annual quota levels from 2002 
through 2005, as well as the fill rate, which is the proportion of the quota which was used 
by the end of each calendar year. For our empirical analysis we define a quota as binding 
if the fill rate is greater than or equal to 90%
14.  In most cases non-binding quotas will 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Scotchmer (1989) shows that with uncertainty, compensation will have to be greater if consumers are 
risk averse. This consideration seems unlikely to be quantitatively important in the current context, where 
apparel is a small share of consumer budgets, so we set it aside in what follows.  
13 Within a given quota group, there may be multiple 3-digit OTEXA categories (also constructed by 
OTEXA) and within each of those, there may be multiple individual 10-digit HS10 codes.  The quota 
groups are closely related to the 3-digit OTEXA categories, but do not necessarily aggregate the same 
categories for each country.  Thus, there may be more quota groups in a given year than 3-digit categories, 
though the former is almost always coarser. 
14 Industry experts define a quota as restrictive or “constraining” if it is filled to between 85 and 90 percent. 
This is because complexities in the quota management system (including complex aggregates) can make it 
difficult to completely fill a quota.  The EU defines quotas 95 percent filled as constraining. See USITC 
(2002). Evans and Harrigan (2005) provide evidence that the price effect of MFA quotas is a step function 
in the fill rate, with the step at about 90%.  
   8
have no effect on prices, but our welfare calculations are not affected by the assumption 
that quotas bind if and only if the fill rate is at least 90%.   
  To illustrate the dimensions of the data, in 2005 the US imported goods in 173 
quota groups and 3,704 10-digit HS codes from 193 countries.  The total value of US 
imports in textile and apparel in 2005 was $97.5 billion, or 4.8% of total US imports. 
The simplest measure of prices that can be constructed from this data is unit 
value, which is defined as the total value of shipments divided by the physical quantity. 

















where  cit v  is the dollar value of imports of HS10 code i in time t from country c,  cit x  is 
the quantity of imports, and cgt I is the set of HS10 codes in quota group g imported in time 
t from country c .  We can re-write the definition of unit value to emphasize the fact that 
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Equation (2) makes it clear that unit values for a given quota group-country can change 
over time even if all individual prices are unchanged: the set of goods can change, and/or 
the relative quantities consumed can change. This property is sufficient to demonstrate 
that changes in quota group unit values should not be used as measures of quota group 
price change.  Feenstra (1994) proposes an exact price index which accounts for changes 
in the set of goods as well as changes in relative quantities consumed, and we adopt his 
methodology for constructing price indices in what follows.  
  Following Feenstra (1994), suppose that the expenditure function for textiles and 

















∑ pb        ( 3 )    9
Aside from functional form there are three assumptions embedded in this specification 
which deserve comment. First, the index i denotes an HS10 code-country combination, 
which means we assume that all goods from a certain country in a given HS10 code are 
perfect substitutes.  Second, the taste parameters b do not change over time. Finally, the 
elasticity of substitution σ > 1 is the same across goods within the quota group.  As an 
aside, we note that we will be making no assumptions about how the higher-level 
expenditure function for overall textile and apparel imports relates to these expenditure 
functions for individual country-quota groups. 
  To develop the Feenstra price index we need to introduce some notation. Omitting 
the implicit cg subscripts to reduce clutter, define 
  It = set of goods imported in year t 
  It-1 = set of goods imported in year t-1 
  It,t-1 = set of “overlap goods” imported in year t and in year t-1 
It will always be the case in our application that It,t-1 is non-empty; often we’ll 





























so λt = (expenditure on overlap goods in t)/(total expenditure in t). In most cases this 












This ratio of ratios can be greater than or less than one. If there isn’t much product 
churning from period to period the numerator and denominator will both be close to one, 
so the ratio will be close to one as well. 
  With this notation established, we can introduce the exact price index F 
associated with the expenditure function (3): 
  () 11
11
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= ∑  and σ is an unknown parameter.  The expenditure weights are given by   10
 
it it it it
it









































(see Feenstra, 1994, equation (3)). This rather baroque expression for the weights can be 
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which implies that the Feenstra index is very similar to a standard chain-weighted price 
index, with the most important wrinkle being that it accounts for new goods.  
Following Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) among others, we can also calculate a 
quality index as the ratio of the unit value index to the exact price index for each quota 
group and exporter.  The key difference between the unit value index and the exact price 
index is that the former uses physical quantity shares in each year as weights for the 
prices in forming the average price over the quota group, while the latter uses value share 
weights when forming the index.  Expressed in logs, we have 
  () 11
11









=− pp xx      (5) 
The interpretation of (5) is that if the unit value index increase more than the exact price 
index, then the quality index rises, reflecting the fact that consumption has shifted 
towards more expensive goods within the category.  We will call this phenomenon 
quality upgrading, and when it is reversed we will call it quality downgrading. It is worth 
emphasizing that quality change under this measure is purely a consequence of changes 
in consumption patterns, not changes in the quality of any individual goods within the 
category. 
  Finally, the definition of the Feenstra price index implicitly defines a measure of 
change in an index of real imports X, 
  () 11
11









=− pp xx      (6)   11
where  tt t V = px  is the nominal value of imports.  
  A reminder about notation is in order at this point. In equations (4), (5) and (6), 
we are constructing the exact price, quality and quantity indices over time for a particular 
exporting country c and quota group g. This means, for example, that the vector pt should 
be interpreted as pcgt. When we implement the welfare calculations described in equations 
(1), we will be summing the exact price indexes given by (4) multiplied by the quantity 
indices (6) over all country-quota group pairs.  
  To implement the price, quality and real imports indices defined by (4), (5) and 
(6) requires data on unit values and quantities of imports by country, time, and HS10 
code, all data that we have. The Feenstra index (4) also requires an estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution σ across products within a given quota group from a given 
country. Broda and Weinstein (2006) have calculated related elasticities using the 
estimation methodology developed by Feenstra (1994), but their results are not directly 
useable for our purposes. The reason is that the Broda-Weinstein elasticities refer to the 
substitution across countries of classes of goods that are much more aggregated than the 
quota groups that we use. Nonetheless, the Broda-Weinstein results are useful for getting 
an idea about plausible values of σ for our purposes. For example, they report an 
elasticity of 3.02 for SITC 841, “MEN'S OR BOYS' COATS, JACKETS, SUITS, 
TROUSERS, SHIRTS, UNDERWEAR ETC. OF WOVEN TEXTILE FABRICS 
(EXCEPT SWIMWEAR AND COATED OR LAMINATED APPAREL), and this 
elasticity is representative of those that they find for other apparel and textile SITC 
codes
15. If we take 3 as a reasonable estimate of the cross-country elasticity of 
substitution for a broad apparel/textile category, it seems likely that the elasticity of 
substitution within countries for less broad categories would be higher. In the results that 
we report below we use σ = 5 but our results are not at all sensitive to changing  σ in the 
range [2,10]. The reason for this insensitivity is simply that there is not much change over 










 in the Feenstra index (4) is close to zero.  
                                                           
15 The full list of elasticities is available on Broda’s website, at 
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/christian.broda/website/research/unrestricted/Research.htm   12
  The empirical unimportance of the new goods adjustment in our application 
means that the Feenstra price index will be numerically very close to standard chain-
weighted indices such as the Törnqvist, which is an exact price index for the translog 
flexible functional form (in fact, when we do the calculations, the Feenstra and Törnqvist 
indices are identical to two decimal places).   
 
5. RESULTS 
For all U.S. imports of apparel and textiles and for every exporting country and quota 
group, we construct price, quality, and real import indices over time using (4), (5) and 
(6). While we have data beginning in 2002, we focus on the difference between 2004 and 
2005, since the MFA expired on January 1 2005. 
  Even before the end of the MFA, a large majority of U.S apparel and textile 
imports were not subject to binding quotas: in 2004, only 17% of imports came in under a 
binding quota, a number that fell to 3.5% in 2005. The reason that the quota share didn’t 
fall to zero is that, as noted above, some quotas were re-imposed (mainly on China) in 
mid-2005 after the increase in imports in early 2005 led to calls for protection. Table 1 
summarizes market shares and quota coverage for the top 20 exporters in 2004 and 2005; 
except for Mexico and Canada, all the biggest exporters had large shares of their trade 
come in under binding quotas.   
  Table 2 reports aggregate results for the top 20 exporters. We report quantity, 
price and quality changes separately for goods subject to a binding quota in 2004 and 
goods which were not quota constrained, as well as a total for all goods. These aggregate 
numbers are chain-weighted averages of growth in individual quota groups, where the 
weights are averages of the 2004 and 2005 shares of each country’s exports.
16  
  The results are most dramatic for the largest exporter, China: prices plummeted 
38% for previously constrained goods, with quality falling by 11%. These price drops 
were associated with a huge increase in the real quantity of imports, with previously 
constrained categories growing by 450%. By contrast, there was no change in price or 
                                                           
16 The usual approximation that, for small changes, price and quality growth sum to value 
growth is not accurate here for two reasons. The first is that so many of the changes are 
very large, and the second is the well-known feature of chain weighting that sums of 
growth rates will not generally equal growth of the sum.   13
quality for previously unconstrained goods from China, although the quantity of 
previously unconstrained goods grew by over 50%. The value of apparel and textile 
imports from China grew by 44%, and this was mainly in previously constrained goods, 
which increased their share of China’s exports from 19% in 2004 to 36% in 2005. This is 
exactly what trade theory predicts, and the magnitudes are striking.  
  The South Asian exporters India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have results similar to 
China, though smaller in magnitude: big drops in price (especially for Pakistan) and some 
drop in quality in previously constrained goods, with little price change in unconstrained 
categories. One surprise is the very fast growth (116%) in real exports of previously 
unconstrained goods from India. This may reflect the fact that some quotas with fill rates 
of less than 90% were nonetheless binding in the case of India. Hong Kong had similar 
price drops in all goods, with quality downgrading as expected in previously constrained 
goods and some quality increase in other goods. Among other previously constrained 
exporters in the top 10, Korea and Indonesia also had experiences consistent with theory. 
  The final column of Table 2 makes it clear that there were some clear losers from 
the end of the MFA. The biggest loser was Mexico, whose real exports fell by 7% and 
total export value fell by 6.5%. The other NAFTA exporter, Canada, suffered a similar 
fate.  
  Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan saw their value of exports fall, with Korea and 
Taiwan actually seeing a drop in real shipments despite being freed from the constraints 
of the MFA. We conjecture that the decline of these three exporters is due to the 
increased competition from China: with low-wage China no longer constrained, the 
relatively high-wage exporters could no longer compete. To state the same point 
somewhat differently, these three countries were large exporters to the U.S. precisely 
because of their historically high quota allocations, an advantage that disappeared on 
January 1 2005. 
  The country results reported in Table 2 are illustrated in Figure 1, which reveals 
the strong negative correlation  (-0.77) between price changes and increases in imports.  
5.1 STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The results just summarized are striking, but Table 2 can not address the question of 
whether the differences between constrained and unconstrained categories are statistically   14
significant. To answer this question we estimate a two way fixed effect model.  Pooling 
across countries c and quota groups g, we estimate  
ln
FF
cgt cg t cgt cgt cgt Fd c q α βγε =+ + + +     (7) 
where ln cgt F  is the exact price index (4), αcg is a fixed effect for each country-quota 
group,  t d is a time fixed effect, and  cgt ε  is an error term. Our measures of the effects of 
quotas are also dummy variables:  cgt c  takes the value 1 if the quota group was binding on 
December 31, 2004 (defined as fill rate greater than 90%) and 0 otherwise, and  cgt q  takes 
the value 1 if the quota group had a quota re-imposed in 2005 that was binding and 0 
otherwise. 
 Thus  β
F is the average reduced form effect of ending a binding quota on the exact 
price index, using only within-cg variation over time, and controlling for the average 
price change in each year. The effect β
F is identified by difference-in-difference 
variation: it says how prices in quota constrained categories changed in 2005 as opposed 
to prices in unconstrained categories.  The null hypothesis is that 
F β <0. 
 The  coefficient  γ
F measures the reduced form effect of new quotas in 2005 on 
prices of the restricted goods in 2005, relative to the baseline, which includes all goods.  
There were 13 quotas active on Chinese exports in 2005, which can be mapped into 11 
binding quotas on categories which were in use pre-2005. Of these 11 binding quotas, 9 
were on categories which were also subject to binding quotas in 2004, thus 
FF β γ + is the 
total average effect on price in 2005 for these 9 categories; for the other two, the effect is 
just γ
F. 
Analogously, we regress the quality indices on the same explanatory variables, 
  ln
QQ
cgt cg t cgt cgt cgt Qd c q α βγε =+ + + +     (8) 
Following the logic in the preceding two paragraphs, the hypothesis that quotas cause 
quality upgrading leads us to expect 
Q β  < 0. 
  We emphasize that our aim in estimating (7) and (8) is purely statistical: are the 
differences reported in Table 2, and illustrated in Figure 1, statistically significant? A 
structural estimate of the effect of quotas on prices is beyond the scope of this paper, as it 
would require a detailed model of market equilibrium in the global apparel and textile   15
industry. To illustrate just one consideration, the United States was not the only big 
importer to wait until the end of 2004 to eliminate most MFA quotas: the European 
Union did the same. Thus the price effects found in our estimates may be related to 
developments in the European market as well, although any such effects would tend to 
dampen the price falls on exports to the US market
17 . The reduced form effects that we 
consistently estimate with (7) and (8) are facts that any model of this episode will have to 
match, but they do not by themselves dictate the form of such a model. 
  We estimate equations (7) and (8) for all countries and quota groups, and 
separately for China and all other countries. The results are reported in Table 3.  When all 
countries are pooled together, the effect of a binding quota in 2004 is to lower prices in 
2005 by 18%, a result which is highly statistically significant. The quality downgrading 
effect is smaller, at -5%, and statistically significant. More illuminating results are seen 
when China is separated from other countries. The binding quota effect is -32% for 
China, and -10% for other countries, both of which are statistically significant. Quality 
downgrading is large and significant for China (-7%, t = -2.7), and much smaller for other 
countries(-4%, t = -2.8).  
 Curiously,  γ
F is large (-21% for prices, -13% for quality), significant and negative 
for China.  We would have expected γ
F to be positive because theory predicts that re-
imposing quotas in 2005 should raise the price and quality of these goods.  But 
considering that reinstating the quotas in 2005 was a protective measure against the 
onslaught of cheap Chinese goods, it is not hard to interpret the negative γ
F:  the U.S. saw 
the prices of these quota groups dropping and reinstated quotas to keep them from 
dropping even more.  Thus, γ
F is picking up the initial price and quality fall resulting from 
the end of the MFA. This interpretation is supported by an analysis of monthly data on 
imports from China, which is summarized in Figure 2. To construct Figure 2, we 
calculated yearly growth rates of values and unit values for each month in 2005 (that is, 
we calculated growth from January 2004 to January 2005, February 2004 to February 
2005, etc). These yearly growth rates control for the very pronounced seasonality in 
                                                           
17 To see this, assume that marginal costs in supplier countries are flat or upward sloping in quantity 
supplied. If they are flat then there is no effect on sales to the US when sales to the EU increase, while if 
they are upward sloping then an increase in supply to the EU will raise costs (and hence limit post-quota 
price declines) to the US.    16
monthly trade data. In the Figure, we divide trade into four categories depending on 
whether quotas were binding in 2004, 2005, both years, or neither year. Panel (a) shows 
that the highest value growth rates in the first half of the year were in those categories 
that had binding quotas in 2004 which were then subject to new quotas by mid-2005. Not 
surprisingly, growth comes to a halt in these categories after the new quotas are imposed. 
Panel (b) confirms our interpretation of our negative estimate of γ
F: the goods which had 
quotas re-imposed had faster unit value drops throughout the year than goods which did 
not have quotas re-imposed. 
  The estimated time fixed effects are of interest because they tell us what prices 
were doing on average in each year. As can be seen from Table 3, the answer is “not 
much”: prices were rising about 5 percent per year in between 2003 and 2005, and quality 
was essentially unchanging. 
  The statistical results can be visualized quite effectively using smoothed 
histograms, or kernel densities. Figure 3 plots the distribution of log price changes 
between 2004 and 2005 for all quota groups except the 11 quota groups that had quotas 
re-imposed in 2005 (we leave out these 11 because doing so yields a clearer picture of the 
MFA’s effect on prices). Quota groups which were constrained in 2004 are plotted 
separately from unconstrained quota groups in Figures 3 and 4, and China is separated 
from other countries.  As one would expect from the regression results, the distribution 
for constrained quota groups is centered to the left of the unconstrained quota group’s 
distribution: constrained quota groups tend to have greater price falls in 2005 than 
unconstrained quota groups.  The effect is much larger for China than for other countries.  
  Figure 4 has the same structure as Figure 3, but plots log quality changes rather 
than price changes. There is clearly evidence of systematic quality downgrading in 
formerly constrained quota groups from China, but much weaker evidence of the same 
phenomenon outside China.   
  As a final check on our regression results, we estimate equations (7) and (8) 
separately for each country, with results reported in Table 5 (time fixed effects are not 
reported to save space). Because of small sample sizes at the country level, many results 
are not statistically significant, but the message is the same as from Table 3: consistently   17
negative and mainly statistically significant point estimates for the price effect of quota 
removal, with smaller and usually statistically insignificant effects on quality. 
5.2 WELFARE EFFECTS 
To calculate the consumer welfare costs of the MFA, we compute the approximations to 
equivalent variation and compensating variation as defined in (1), taking 2004 as the pre-
reform period and 2005 as the post-reform period.  For welfare comparisons, the correct 
price to use in each year is the price received by foreign residents, which means that the 
price should not include tariff revenue.  The correct treatment of transport charges 
depends on who pays them: if foreigners pay them then the price relevant to U.S. 
residents does not include transport charges, but if U.S. residents pay the transport 
charges then they should be included in the price for welfare calculations. We have 
accurate data on transport costs but not on their incidence, so we do the calculations using 
the two extreme assumptions that they are paid completely by foreigners (the f.o.b. or 
“free on board” price) and completely by U.S. residents (the c.i.f or “cost, insurance, and 
freight” price). We report results for the simple average of these polar assumptions on 
transport cost incidence in Table 5. The Table reports total changes in welfare, and also 
reports subtotals by 2004 quota coverage and by exporter. 
  The interpretation of the numbers in Table 5 is straightforward. The approximate 
equivalent variation between 2004 and 2005, or the amount US consumers in 2005 would 
need to be paid to go back to the pre-reform period, was $9.77 billion.  The compensating 
variation, or the amount US consumers would have been willing to pay to be rid of the 
MFA in 2004, is -$336 million.  
  The fact that CV is slightly negative is a surprise. Numerically, the explanation is 
simple: by using pre-reform quantity weights, our approximation to CV gives very little 
weight to the products whose prices fell the most. Some prices rose between 2004 and 
2005, and these products had substantial market share in 2004. For example, prices from 
Mexico, the second biggest supplier, rose 4%, while prices from Korea rose 7% (see 
Table 2).  These price increases get a negative weight in the CV calculation, and roughly 
balance out the price falls from previously quota constrained goods. By contrast, our 
approximation to EV reflects the changes in market share in 2005, where falling prices   18
led to big expansions. The measure W uses the simple average of pre and post-reform 
quantities as weights, and delivers a welfare gain of $4.72 billion. 
  Unsurprisingly, almost 90% of the welfare gain came from goods which were 
previously constrained, although falling prices of previously unconstrained goods were 
also worth more than $1.2 billion in EV (second and third rows of Table 5).  When 
looking at subtotals by exporter, it is striking that the overwhelming majority of the 
welfare gain is due to China, which accounted for $8.1 billion or 83% of the total EV. 
The second largest positive contribution came from Pakistan, at $462 million. Other large 
previously constrained exporters (India, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Bangladesh) each 
accounted for around $250 million in welfare improvement. A few countries had negative 
welfare contributions, most notably Mexico, Italy, and Turkey. These exporters lost their 
preferential access to the U.S. market when the MFA expired, and their prices rose, thus 
leading to a negative welfare effect for U.S. consumers. 
  How big are these numbers? There were 111 million households in the U.S. in 
2005, and the median household spent about $1,400 on apparel
18. Our calculation of EV 
implies an annual cost of $88 per household (6.3% of the median apparel budget).  
  The beneficiaries of the MFA included holders of quota rights, and the U.S. 
workers and firms who benefited from protection. There were 737,000 U.S. workers in 
the apparel and textile sectors in 2004, with an average annual salary of $31,500
19. We 
can not estimate what employment and earnings in these sectors would have been in the 
absence of the MFA, but it seems likely that this import competing sector would have 
been badly hit. What we can do is calculate the consumer cost per job of providing MFA 
protection. Dividing our estimate of equivalent variation by employment gives a 
consumer cost of $13,260 per job protected, or 42% of average wages in the industry.   
                                                           
18 The number of households comes from the Census Bureau’s 2005 American Community Survey. Median 
household expenditure on apparel is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2004 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, which reports (Table 1) that the middle quintile of consumer units (which are similar 
to households) spent $1,477 on “Apparel and services”, a category that includes dry cleaning, tailoring, etc, 
so we round down to $1,400. 
19 Source is the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The industry is defined as NAICS 1997 codes 
313/314/315/316, which is Textile Mills, Textile Product Mills, Apparel Manufacturing, and Leather and 
Allied Product Manufacturing.   19
6. CONCLUSION 
The end of the MFA in 2004 provided a unique opportunity to robustly test some simple 
predictions of the theory of trade policy: quotas raise prices and lead to inefficient quality 
upgrading. We showed that this is exactly what happened: in quota constrained 
categories, prices fell 38% from China and quality fell 11%. The price effects were also 
substantial for non-Chinese exporters, with little evidence of quality downgrading. 
  We are also able to calculate the consumer welfare cost of the MFA. Focusing on 
the ex post equivalent variation measure of welfare, we find a gain of $9.8 billion, mainly 
due to lower prices on imports from China. This gain amounts to an annual benefit per 
U.S. household of  about $90, which is more than 6% of the median household budget. 
We can also compare the welfare gain to the size of the domestic employment in the 
apparel and textile sector which was protected by the MFA. We find that the equivalent 
variation per job protected was more than $13,000 per job protected, which is over 40% 
of the average salary in the sector.  
  Despite the flood of cheap Chinese imports in 2005, most other textile and apparel 
exporters did not suffer from the Chinese market share increase. The reason is that many 
other big exporters (especially India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia) were able to 
increase their sales to the U.S. market when their quotas were removed,. The biggest 
exceptions were countries that previously had  privileged access to the U.S. market 
(including Mexico, Canada, Honduras and El Salvador), who saw export revenues drop. 
Relatively developed exporters such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea also suffered 
export losses despite having their quotas removed, an outcome which probably reflects 
the fact that  these countries could not compete with low-wage exporters in the absence 
of their historically high quota allocations.    20
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2004 2004  2005 
China   18.0  20.7  27.8 
Mexico 0  9.7  8.4 
India 36.0  4.5  5.3 
Canada 0  4.1  3.6 
Hong Kong  50.4  3.6  2.9 
Korea 27.7  3.4  2.4 
Honduras 0  3.1  2.8 
Vietnam 29.1  3.1  3.0 
Indonesia 64.2  2.9  3.2 
Pakistan 42.3  2.9  3.1 
Italy 0  2.8  2.5 
Taiwan 18.5  2.6  2.0 
Thailand 18.0  2.6  2.3 
Bangladesh 34.9  2.3 2.6 
Philippines 31.6  2.2  2.0 
Turkey 2.3  2.0  1.7 
El Salvador  0  2.0  1.7 
Sri Lanka  28.0  1.8  1.8 
Guatemala 0.3 1.7  1.5 
Cambodia 44.4  1.6  1.8 
Other   20.5  17.5 
Total 16.7  100.0  100.0   24
Table 2 - Quantity, price, quality and value change 2004-2005,  
U.S. Apparel and textile imports, top 20 exporters 
 
Notes to Table 2: All entries are percent changes between 2004 and 2005. Columns headed  “bound 2004” 
aggregate products subject to a binding quota in 2004, with all other products aggregated in the “not bound” 
columns. 














2004  total 
China   155.9  51.8 449.6 -10.2 -1.0 -37.8  -3.0 -0.3 -11.2 44.7
Mexico -7.0  -7.0 4.0 4.0   0.6 0.6 -6.5
India 124.5  166.3 54.1 -1.9 2.3 -9.2  -1.2 -0.4 -2.7 27.6
Canada  -2.0 -2.0 1.7 1.7  -0.9 -0.9 -5.3
Hong Kong  21.8  27.5 16.9 -2.2 -1.6 -2.8  0.6 5.5 -4.0 -13.7
Korea -11.3  -14.0 -3.7 3.9 7.1 -4.9  -2.3 -1.7 -3.8 -21.9
Honduras 1.8  1.8 -1.8 -1.8   -2.3 -2.3 -1.9
Vietnam 11.0  18.5 -9.4 3.0 2.2 5.0  0.4 0.6 0.0 5.9
Indonesia 41.7  27.8 49.3 -5.0 1.7 -8.4  -1.7 0.4 -2.7 18.0
Pakistan 54.7  -0.1 113.3 -8.6 -0.4 -17.6  0.4 0.5 0.2 14.4
Italy -11.5  -11.5 12.4 12.4   0.3 0.3 -4.0
Taiwan -11.7  -11.1 -14.6 3.5 3.4 4.1  0.4 0.7 -0.9 -19.3
Thailand  6.9 -1.4 39.6 0.1 1.8 -6.5 -3.1 -3.3 -2.3 -3.1
Bangladesh 40.0 25.0 64.6 -6.6 -4.9 -9.2  -1.6 -2.1 -0.7 18.8
Philippines 19.2 8.0 41.6 -3.4 -0.2 -9.7  -2.7 -2.2 -3.7 -1.1
Turkey -7.6  -9.6 53.7 8.4 8.5 6.1  4.6 5.3 -16.6 -8.3
El Salvador  0.8  0.8 -2.7 -2.7   -4.1 -4.1 -6.3
Sri Lanka  19.2  9.6 41.5 -3.1 -0.6 -8.4  -2.4 -2.6 -2.1 5.5
Guatemala 2.3  0.8 202.8 -3.9 -4.0 0.2  -0.4 -0.3 -7.5 -6.1
Cambodia 41.2 8.9 75.5 -7.0 1.7 -16.1  -2.6 0.0 -5.3 19.9  25
Figure 1a - Price changes 2004-2005,  
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Figure 1b - Quantity changes 2004-2005, 
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Table 3 - Regression estimates of effects of MFA elimination on price, quality 
 






0.02 -0.03 0.03  2003 
3.43  -1.32 3.55 
0.07 0.03 0.07  2004  
8.63 1.49 8.55 
0.06 -0.06 0.06  2005 
8.06 -2.60 8.23 
-0.18 -0.32 -0.10  F β  
-8.75 -7.06 -5.85 




-6.39 -2.79   
-0.01 -0.00 -0.01  2003 
-1.59 -0.24 -1.57 
-0.05 -0.00 -0.05  2004 
-7.59 -0.13 -7.59 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01  2005 
-0.87 -1.19 -0.84 
-0.05 -0.07 -0.04  F β  
-4.39 -2.67 -2.84 




-2.59 -1.83    
total 26,540 637  25,903  Sample 
size  Quota 
groups  8,526 160 8366 
 
Notes to Table 3: Each column presents results from two regressions, with log price and log quality respectively 
regressed on the same set of indicator variables. Robust t-statistics in italics below OLS slope estimates. 
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Table 4 - Regression estimates of effects of MFA elimination on price, quality, top 20 exporters 
 
Notes to Table 4: Each row presents results from two regressions, with year fixed effects suppressed. Robust t-
statistics in italics to the right of OLS slope estimates. 
 Price  Quality  sample  size 
  F β   γ
F 
F β   γ
F  total 
quota 
groups
China   -0.32  -7.1 -0.21 -2.8 -0.07 -2.7  -0.13 -1.8 637 160
Mexico     522 145
India -0.13  -2.1 -0.08 -1.9  520 142
Canada     641 164
Hong Kong  -0.10  -1.4 0.01 0.2  462 123
Korea -0.19  -3.8 0.01 0.3  502 140
Honduras     199 60
Vietnam -0.04  -0.7 0.02 0.6  385 120
Indonesia -0.09 -2.0 -0.05 -1.3  428 120
Pakistan -0.17  -1.8 -0.03 -0.6  339 99
Italy     671 168
Taiwan 0.05  0.4 0.03 0.6  433 126
Thailand -0.04  -0.7 -0.06 -0.9  489 135
Bangladesh -0.08  -1.2 0.05 1.0  280 83
Philippines -0.17  -2.5 -0.01 -0.2  380 114
Turkey 0.04  0.5 -0.24 -1.6  455 135
El Salvador      269 78
Sri Lanka  -0.03  -0.4 0.01 0.2  254 78
Guatemala -0.05  -0.9 -0.10 -3.3  293 91
Cambodia -0.26 -5.0 -0.12 -1.8  207 70  29
Figure 2 - Monthly changes, Chinese exports 2005 
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Figure 2, continued - Monthly changes, Chinese exports 2005 
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Figure 4 - Distribution of quality changes, 2004-2005 
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Table 5 - Consumer welfare consequences of the end of the MFA 
 
EV W CV 
total 9,773 4,718 -336 
by binding quota status in 2004: 
unconstrained 1,215 -535 -2,286 
constrained 8,558 5,254 1,950 
by exporter: 
China   8,131 4,660 1,189 
Mexico -232 -267 -302 
India 248 152 57 
Canada 40 -15 -71 
Hong Kong  234 118 3 
Korea -13 -91 -169 
Honduras 59 59 58 
Vietnam -76 -81 -87 
Indonesia 261 191 121 
Pakistan 462 328 194 
Italy -243 -287 -331 
Taiwan -21 -62 -102 
Thailand 47 17 -13 
Bangladesh 264 194 124 
Philippines 166 110 55 
Turkey -118 -137 -156 
El Salvador  74 61 47 
Sri Lanka  75 66 56 
Guatemala 70 64 57 
Cambodia 191 143 94 
Rest of world   153 -504 -1,160 
 
Notes to Table 5: EV and CV denote first-order approximations to equivalent and 
compensating variation respectively. W is an average of EV and CV. See text for details. 
For each measure we calculate two values, corresponding to the polar assumptions that 
US residents pay zero and 100% of transport costs. The numbers in the table are the 
simple averages of theses two polar assumptions. 
  The first row reports the net effect of the change, which is a sum over all products 
and exporters. The next two rows report subtotals over goods which were or were not 
subject to binding quotas at the end of 2004. The final set of rows reports subtotals by 
exporting country.  
 